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Current Position: English >> Journals >> Research for Institutional Economics >> 正文
Title; Author(s); Abstract; Key Words;in Research on Institutional Economics Vol.2010 No.4
Updat:Apr 26, 2011   Author:   Click:[]

1TitleIncome Distribution Inequity, National Education and Violent Crimes in China: An Empirical Study

Author(s):Chen Yili Zhang Weiguo

Abstract:Through the empirical inspection of violent crime rates 1981-2007 in China, we find that the income distribution inequity whatever in nation、cities、countryside or between cities and country all give a remarkable impact on violent crime; improvement of national education can reduce violent crime rates; the sex ratio、family disruption and urbanization have an influence on violent crime too; the violent crime rates have a inertia apparently.

Key words:Income Distribution Inequity; National Education; Violent Crimes

JEL Classifications: K14

2TitleThe Optimal Choice ofImputation Principles of Patent Infringement— AMethod ofEconomic Pattern

Author(s):Wang Peng

Abstract:The main body of the pattern includes the patentee and the infringer. The tort is influenced by two factors: the degree of care and that of activity. The optimum social target is to minimize the whole social cost of patent infringement or the whole loss of anticipated tort. By building a pattern that the care level is the only factor for defining liability and another pattern that both the care level and the activity level act together as factors for defining liability, we can conclude through analysis that the imputation principle without fault can be applied to manufacturers and importers, whereas the imputation principle with fault can be applied to sellers and users as an efficient choice.

Key Words:patent infringement imputation principles pattern

JEL Classifications: K42

3TitleLaw and Economic Growth: The Guangdong Experience

Author(s):Huang Jianmei

Abstract:Under the background of Guangdong’s continuous Early and Pilot Implementation policies and China entering the key period of transforming the economic developing pattern, this paper explores the special patterns of Law and Chinese Economic Growth by analyzing the practices of Guangdong’ reform and opening up and legislation. The study uses Law and Economics theories as analysis tools, and tries to analyze the Guangdong Experience in the relation of Law and Chinese Economic Growth, aiming at extending the research on reform and opening experiences. Exploring the Guangdong experience, this research could enhance the studying the answer for China’s Puzzle in the field of Law and Economic Growth, meanwhile it could provide some helpful advice for how to fulfill Guangdong’s mission on pioneer of scientific development.

Key words: Reform and Open; Law; Economic Growth; Guangdong Experience

JEL Classifications: K00 E11

4TitleAn Economic Explanation to Corporate Governance Models all over the World

Author(s):DONG-Zhiqiang

Abstract:A theoretical model is developed in this paper to deliver an economic explanation to corporate governance models all over the world. The model shows that, monitoring system in which director board counterbalances the management is suitable for the strong or middle-strong investor protection cases, in which the ownership is dispersed and there is no any controlling-shareholder or major-shareholder do not have capability to manipulate the management to collude for expropriation; that counterbalancing management by a director board and supervising controlling-shareholder and management by a supervisor board is more suitable for middle-weak investor protection case, in which the ownership are centralized, and there is a controlling shareholder who affect director board substantially, even may dominate and control the board and management to expropriate the outside minority shareholders; the ownership will be fully centralized and controlled by family in the weak investor protection case, in which family firms will be presence, and there is no any modern companies in the sense of separating ownership-management, let alone modern corporation governance. The results of the model are to some extent meaningful for discussing whether to abolish supervisor board or not in listed companies in China.

Key words:Investor protection; Cooperate governance; Ownership structure; Governance Model; Multi-hierarchies Agency

JEL Classification:G30; L20; D21

5.Title:From Rationing to Free Choice: Housing Reform and the Change of the Determinants of Housing Demand in China

Author(s):Dong Xiaofang Fu Shihe

Abstract:This paper uses the 1989, 1997, and 2005 China urban household survey data and estimates endogenous switching regression models to study the change of the determinants of demand for housing and latent demand for housing during the course of thirty years housing reform. We find that housing reform has been successful in terms of efficiency and fairness in housing allocation: The determinants of housing demand have changed from personal job position and public sector to income and rents; and the latent demand for housing by public-housing occupiers has reduced significantly.

Key Words: Latent demand; Endogenous switching regression; Housing reform

JEL Classification:D12; P36; R21

6TitlePsseudo-collective, True Collectiv and Social Welfare Function

Author(s):Mo Zhihong

Abstract:Social welfare function (SWF) is an important concept in neoclassical economics. For many people its scientificity is beyond doubt. By introducing the concept of pseudo-collective and true collective, this paper attempts to dwell upon the methodological confusion centering upon the SWF. It shows that, given that the SWF is exogenously given, not endogenously derived from individual’s voluntary choice, it is doomed to be on the opposite of individualism, and in practice would necessarily be used as the tool to control the action of the individual concerned; just like the pseudo-collective which binds individuals together through coercion, the SWF whose essence is collectivism would necessarily be self-defeating in practice.

Key words:social welfare function pseudo-collective true collective individualism collectivism

JEL Classifications:B21 D21

7TitleOn the Complexity and System Science Thought in Hayek’s Economic Theory

Author(s):Liu Yejin

Abstract:this paper sorts out the complexity and system science thought of Hayek’s systematically which was behind his economic theory. The economic system is a kind of complex adaptive systems (CAS) that consists of large number of agents’ interaction, for the rearch of which the “date” or "facts" should be viewed as being of different nature from that in natural science. In the economic system, rule-following behavior would lead to the emergence of spontaneous order on large-scale. The Hayekian "spontaneous order" is the macro-order emerging out from a complex adaptive system

Key words:complexity general rule order emergence

JEL classificationD83 K14 B53

8TitleInstitutional Transitions and the Evolution of Inter-firm Ties: An Embeddedness View

Author(s):Zou Guoqing Zheng Jianying Gao Xiangfei

Abstract:Based on the two-phase model of institutional transitions, this paper investigates the internal mechanisms of the evolution of inter-firm ties by new economic sociology. The conclusion is that the evolutionary resource of inter-firm ties is from the change of social structure and social ties lead by institutional transitions. To be specific, in the changing process of main social relations fromguanxito contractual relations, the special trust will gradually spread to general trust, thus leading to the enlargement of selecting collection for organizational behavior embedded in social structure, and then facilitates the change of formation and effect mechanism of inter-firm ties

Keywords: institutional transitions; evolution of inter-firm ties; trust; embeddedness

JEL Classifications: D21 Z13

9TitleAStudy on the Historical Formation of Wenzhou Private Economy in Zhejiang Province, China: focusing on Historical Institutionalism

Author(s):Lee, Sang-Bin

AbstractDespite Wenzhou has not benefited much from its local advantages as a geographically peripheral part of Zhejiang Province, Wenzhou has successfully developed its private economy. The private economy of Wenzhou has been promoted by the tradition of historical trade and commerce in Wenzhou region which depends on a network of Wenzhou traders working throughout China. The tradition of business and its development of private enterprise in Wenzhou established the Wenzhounese social network to conduct commercial and trade activities using their own efforts, in which improved their own economic situation at considerable political risk. Wenzhou people were historically influenced by the value of utilitarian Confucianism of ‘material bears morals' from ‘the school of Yongjia thought'. This study uses the theoretical approach of the 'historical institutionalism' to make an analysis the historical formation of Wenzhou private economy development. Finally, we attempted to explain that since the economic reform across rural China, the economic growth of Wenzhou is generally initiated from the 'self-reinforced' business activity of Wenzhou people which results from historical and cultural experience of Wenzhou region.

Keyword:Wenzhou, private economy, historical institutionalism, the personalized network, culture

JEL Classifications: D02

10TitleRelative Competitive Intensity, Interest Groups and Free Trade Policy

Author(s):Liu Dewei Li Lianfen

Abstract:In traditional international trade theory, countries participating in international division of labor according to their comparative advantage or factor endowments differences will be eligible for more benefits. However, free trade policy is non-neutral for different people or interest groups, which makes some interest groups influence trade policy by lobbying, political contributions, or other means. This paper takes the relative competitive intensity into the analysis framework of interest groups and the trade policy , and use the relative competitive intensitye to explain interest groups' desire that want to influence the trade policy through the means of political contributions or lobbying .

Keywords:the relative competitive intensity;interest groups;free trade policy

JEL ClassificationsF12;F14;F43

11TitleThe Effects of Transaction Efficiency on Trade Protection——Analysis Based on New Political Economics Trade Policy

Author(s):WangYongjin Sheng Dan

Abstract: By incorporating transaction cost into the new trade policy political economics model, this paper investigates the effects of transaction efficiency on trade protection.The model shows that: (1) When there are no adverse price shocks, the relationship between transaction efficiency and protection level exhibits an inverted-U shape; (2) When there are price shocks, the protection level will increase discretely, and furthermore, the higher the transaction efficiency, the higher the protection level will increase.

Keywords: Transaction Efficiency; Trade Protection; New political Economics

JEL Classifications: D78

12TitleA Development and Return of New Institutional Economics from Property Right to State Sovereignty

Author(s):Song Bingtao

Abstract:This paper discusses < Freedom and Growth> by appraising its contributions in its stress on the role of state sovereignty in the rise of Europe on the basis of criticizing the emphasis on property right by North. Even without a theory of public economics to support author’s point, this book still promotes the development of Institutional Economics. By introducing and discussing this book, we suggest that the combination of Public Economics and Institutional Economics will provide a new explanation for the Industrial Revolution in the future from the perspective of state structural change.

Key Words:State Sovereignty property right Public Economics

JEL Classifications: N44, B25, P16

13TitleThe quality of institutions: A genetic programming approach

Author(s):Marcos Álvarez-Díaz Gonzalo Caballero Miguez

Translator(s)Jiang Xia

AbstractThe new institutional economics has studied the determinants of the quality of institutions. Traditionally, the majority of the empirical literature has adopted a parametric and linear approach. These forms impose ad hoc functional structures, sometimes introducing relationships between variables that are forced and misleading. This paper analyses the determinants of the quality of institutions using a non-parametric and non-linear approach. Specifically, we employ a Genetic Program (GP) to study the functional relation between the quality of institutions and a set of historical, economical, geographical, religious and social variables. Besides this, we compare the obtained results with those employing a parametric perspective (Ordinary Least Square Regression). Following the empirical results of our application, we can conclude that the parametric perspective adopted in previous papers about institutional quality could be accurate.

Key wordsQuality of institutions; Institutional determinants; Non-parametric perspective; Genetic programming

JEL classifications:O10; O50; C14

Last:Title; Author(s); Abstract; Key Words of Research on Institutional Economics Vol.2011 No.1 Next:Research of Institutional Economics, Vol.29 (No.3 2010)

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